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Small disturbances can trigger cascading failures in
power grids
Yubo Huang, Junguo Lu, Weidong Zhang
Abstract—With the sharp increase of power demand, large-
scale blackouts in power grids occur frequently around the
world. Cascading failures are the main causes of network outages.
Therefore, revealing the complicated cascade mechanism in grids
is conducive to design the efficient policy to restrain the failures
and further ensure a stable supply of power to users. Motivated
by the recent advances of network dynamics, we proposed a
framework based Lyapunov stability to analyze the dynamically
induced cascading failures in complex networks. We abandoned
the assumption that the network is stable in traditional static
failure models and then detected that small disturbances actually
can trigger cascading failures in unstable networks. What’s
worse, such failure usually accompanied the overload failure of
lines during the equilibriums conversion process. Through the
simulation analysis of the Spanish grid, we summarized that the
features of this new failure mode include low incidence, large
destructiveness, and fast propagation speed. And it usually tends
to occur first in edge nodes and subsequently propagate to the
central nodes. These features are consistent with the empirical
observation of outages in practice.
Index Terms—complex networks, small disturbances, cascad-
ing failures, Lyapunov stablity.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE efficient operation of society and individuals is in-separable from a variety of networks. Communication
networks promote information flow and cultural exchanges
between distant regions [1]; Transportation networks have
greatly increased the convenience of travel [2]; Protein net-
works enable the body to function properly [3]; We are so
heavily dependent on these natural or man-made networks that
we will be troubled when networks crash. The most typical
example is the power outage. For instance, the German grid
closed a 380, 000V cable that caused a blackout in Europe in
2006 [4]. In 2008, the plant fault caused by snowstorms led
to large-scale power outages in Hunan Province, China [5].
In 2009, the storm destroyed several substations and caused
67 million people in Brazil to fall into power outages [6]. In
2012, the circuit overload during the peak period of power
consumption caused a blackout in India [7]. These blackouts
have negatively affected millions of people and caused serious
economic loss. From the listed power outages cases, we can
straightforwardly conclude that the paralysis of the entire
network often triggered by the breakdown of few3 nodes or
edges (e.g. the fault of plants or transmission lines caused
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human or natural factors) [4, 8, 9]. Many studies indicate
that cascading propagation mechanism is the main culprit in
inducing network from local failure to global failure [10].
What external factors can cause the failure of nodes or
lines [11, 12] and how the failure of one node or line
propagates to its neighbors are still two controversial issues
in complex networks. Recently, many researchers attempt to
answer the two questions from the perspective of dynamics
and have made significant advances [13–15].
In power grids, normally, all nodes (plants) operates syn-
chronically at the equilibrium with the standard frequency
Ω [16]. The flow of a transmission line depends on the
phase difference between the nodes at both ends. In sync
state, the phase of each node is locked so that the grid
can generate steady flows to users [17]. The sync state is
highly susceptible to external factors (i.e. attacks [18]) that can
cause plants fault [19]. Then the network may collapse duo
to cascade propagation. Early research on cascading failures
mainly focused on network topologies [20] and found that the
vulnerability of the network to intentional attacks or random
failures depends on the structure of the network [21]. For
example, the heterogeneous networks such as scale-free (SF)
networks display unexpected robustness to random failures
but is vulnerable to intentional attacks. The error and attack
tolerance is equivalent to homogeneous networks (e.g. ER
networks) [22]. Therefore, numerous strategies are proposed
to resist cascading failure by optimizing the topology of
networks [23]. These topology-based static methods indeed
obtained some desirable results, yet fail to detect all failures
during the power outage since they ignored the exceptional
dynamic behaviors of nodes and flows [24–26]. To solve
this problem, many dynamic models [27–30] are proposed to
study the transient dynamics of AC power grids and the most
widely accepted is the coarse-scale swing equation (Kuramoto-
like model) [31]. In this model, each node is regarded as
an oscillator and different nodes are coupled by a sinusoidal
function which can spontaneously direct the network to a
synchronous state [32]. Therefore, this model can clearly
describe the transient dynamics of the entire network and then
captures the exceptional dynamic behaivors which may trigger
cascading failures.
In this article, we proposed a framework based on network
dynamics to reveal the complicate occurrence and propagation
mechanisms of cascading failures. First, the swing equation
was introduced to describe the coupling dynamics of nodes.
Based on the dynamic equation, the Newton downhill algo-
rithm was utilized to solve the equilibrium of the network.
Then, we defined the Lyapunov stability of complex networks
2and derived the criterions of Lyapunov stability to judge the
stability of an equilibrium. We found that small disturbances
can induce the shutdown of the nodes with exceptional dynam-
ics and further trigger cascade in unstable networks. Through
the simulation analysis of the Spanish grid, we concluded that
this kind of failure was difficult to occur but could cause
power outages throughout the grid once it happens. Faults
tended to occur first in less-degree nodes and then indirectly
cause the failure of hub nodes through cascade propagation.
The propagation speed of the cascade was so quick that it
can easily escape the grid protection mechanism, and that
implies most control methods are useless for this failure
mode. Furthermore, such failure usually accompanied the
other failure mode named overload failure of lines during the
equilibria conversion process and it accelerates the paralysis of
the network. Finally, the dynamic framework discussed above
is not limited to power grids and can apply to other networks,
such as communication networks, micro-circuit networks, etc.,
just with appropriate modifications.
II. THE STABILITY ANALYSIS OF POWER GRIDS
In this section, the swing equation is introduced to describe
the dynamics of power grids and we subsequently utilize the
Newton downhill method to solve the equilibria of grids based
on the swing equation. Afterward, the Lyapunov method is
used for determining the stability of the obtained equilibria.
A. Modeling power grids
A power grid can be abstracted into a weighted graph
G = (V,E) (Fig. 1a), where V (|V | = N) is the vertices set
and E(|E| = L) is the edges set of G. One vertex can be a
generator (generating power) or consumer (consuming power)
but they are all regarded as rotating machines (oscillators) in
swing equation (Fig. 1b). If two vertices are linked (through
the transmission line), G(i, j) = 1, otherwise, G(i, j) = 0.
The state of oscillators i is completely characterized by its
phase θi and the phase velocity ωi = θ˙i relative to the refer-
ence frequency Ω = 2pi = 50/60Hz of the electric system.
The flow of Eij depends on the phase difference ∆θij of Vi
and Vj (Fig. 1c). Thereby, to guarantee steady power flows in
grids, all oscillators should run at the same frequency (∀i, ωi =
0. In this state, the phases of all machines are locked),
which is called synchronization. How to force all machines
to operate synchronously? The answer is the coupling effect
between linked oscillators. In the swing equation [31], the
sufficiently large coupling strengthKij = kijGij , governed by
the topology Gij of the network and the interaction strength
kij of oscillators (In power grids, kij = BijUiUj , where Bij is
the susceptance between two machines and U is the voltage of
the grid), will urge the local group of oscillators to be in step
and further direct the entire network to synchronize.Mi is the
inertia term of oscillator i which is usually assumed to be 1.Di
is damping constant of the oscillator i and we will prove that it
determines the transition time of the oscillator from one state
to another in subsection III-B. Pi denotes the power generated
(consumed) by the machine including damping and electric
Fig. 1. The schematic diagram of a small power grid: a The graph of the
small grid with two generators (squares) and three consumers (circles). In our
simulation, Mi = 1, Di = 0.6, K = 1.63 b The green points (rotating
machines) run synchronously with frequency Ω, whereas the red points lose
synchronization. c The power generated by generator G includes damping
dissipation and transmission to consumer C. The flow I is determined by the
phase difference of node G and node M . d-f, Re(λ1, λ2, · · · , λn) are the
real parts of the eigenvalues of matrix H , θ0 denotes the initial state of the
system and θe denotes the equilibrium of the system. Sε is the restricted area
of f(θ(t)) and Sδ is the restricted area of the initial equilibrium θ
0. d is
the state track of the stable network. e is the state track of the asymptotically
stable network and f is the state track of the unstable network.
power exchanged with its neighbors (Fig. 1c). Here, we use
per unit (p.u.) to quantify Pi, where Pp.u. = 1s
−2 = 100MW .
f(θ, t) = Mi
d2
dt2
θi(t) +Di
d
dt
θi(t)
= Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θj(t)− θi(t))
(1)
After establishing the dynamic equation of each oscillator, the
flow on Eij at time t can be computed by:
Fij(t) = Kij sin(θj(t)− θi(t)) (2)
From the above analysis, we can summarize the prerequisite
for stable operation of the power system is that the phases of
all oscillators are locked and it means the system is in sync at
the reference Ω. The desired synchronous state of the system
is denoted as θe = [θe1, θ
e
2, · · · , θ
e
N ]. In control theory, this
state is also called the equilibrium duo to ∀i, θ¨ = θ˙ = 0.
Therefore, the swing equation becomes:{
0 = Pi +
∑N
j=1Kij sin(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )
s.t.
∑N
i=1 Pi = 0
(3)
For large-scale networks, solving these nonlinear equations
presents challenge duo to the strict restriction1. In this paper,
we use Newton downhill algorithm (Algorithm 1) to solve
these equations, where f is the Eq. (3), ε1 and ε2 are the
error coefficients, and δ is a small random vector used for
avoiding the infinite loops.
B. Lyapunov stability analysis of power grids
Roughly, a power system is inevitable to suffer external
small disturbances, and an equilibrium is considering stable
1For small network, this equations can be solve by the @fslove tool in
MATLAB
3Algorithm 1 Newton Downhill Algorithm
Input: Network G, f , ε1, ε2, δ
Output: θe
1: for i = 1 to N do
2: θ0i = 0; % Initialization; θi can also be randomly
generated
3: end for
4: λ = 1, k = 0; % λ is the downhill factor
5: for i = 1 to N do
6: θk+1i = θ
k
i − λ
fi(θ
k)
f ′
i
(θk) ; % Newton iteration
7: end for
8: if |f(θk+1)| < |f(θk)| then
9: if |θk+1 − θk| < ε1 then
10: θe = θk+1, Return; % satisfy the termination con-
dition
11: else
12: θk = θk+1, θk+1 = 0, k = k + 1; % Enter the next
iteration
13: back to step 5
14: end if
15: end if
16: if |f(θk+1)| >= |f(θk)| then
17: if λ < ελ and |f(x
k+1)| <= ε2 then
18: θe = θk, Return; % Satisfy the termination condi-
tion
19: else
20: if λ < ελ and |f(x
k+1)| > ε2 then
21: θk = θk+1 + δ, back to step 5; % Avoid infinite
loops
22: end if
23: end if
24: if λ >= ελ and |f(θ
k+1)| > ε2 then
25: λ = λ2 , back to step 5; % Newton downhill iteration
26: end if
27: end if
if the system can restore to the original equilibrium with
sufficient accuracy after small disturbances disappear (Fig. 1d-
e). If the system moves away from the equilibrium after small
disturbances, then the equilibrium is unstable (Fig. 1f). In
this subsection, we will definite the Lyapunov stability of the
power system and subsequently derive the stability criteria.
The mathematical definition of Lyapunov stability of power
systems is: ∀ ε > 0, ∃ δ(ε, t0), if any point θ(t) on the
trajectory staring from any initial state in the set {θ0 : ‖θ0 −
θ
e‖ < δ(ε, t0)} satisfies: ‖f(θ(t); θ
0, t0)‖ ≤ ε, t0 ≤ t ≤ ∞,
the system is stable (Fig. 1d). If limt→∞ ‖θ(t) − θ
e‖ = 0,
the system is asymptotically stable (Fig. 1e). Otherwise, the
system is unstable (Fig. 1f). From the definition, we can
summarize that the Lyapunov stability requires the trajectory
of the stable system from any point near the equilibria always
stays a certain range of the equilibria rather than restores to
the original equilibria. Therefore, it is more extensive than the
traditional stability.
Then, we will introduce the Lyapunov stability criterion of
power system at equilibrium θe and the potential function for
θ is defined as:
V (θ) = −
N∑
i=1
Piθi −
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
Kij cos(θi − θj) (4)
From Eq. (3), ∂V
∂θi
|θi = θ
e
i = 0, ∀i and thus θ
e is a extremum
of V (θ). The Hesse matrix H of the potential function V is:
DF =
∂f
∂θ
|θ=θe =


∂f1
∂θ1
∂f1
∂θ2
· · · ∂f1
∂θN
∂f2
∂θ1
∂f2
∂θ2
· · · ∂f2
∂θN
...
...
. . .
...
∂fN
∂θ1
∂fN
∂θ2
· · · ∂fN
∂θN


(5)
DFij =


∑
j 6=i
−σij
N
Aij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) i = j
σij
N
Aij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) Otherwise
H = −DF
(6)
Based on the Hesse matrix H , the Lyapunov stability criterion
of power systems is derived in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: For a given system (network)G and a equilibrium
θ
e, λ = [λ1, λ2, · · · , λN ] are the eigenvalues of H and are
ranked by their real part such that λ1 = 0 [17] and λ2 < λ3 <
· · · < λN .
• If Re(λ2 > 0), the system is asymptotically stable
(Fig. 1c). lim
t→∞
‖θ(t)− θe‖ = 0.
• If Re(λ2 = 0), the system G is stable in the sense of
Lyapunov (Fig. 1d). lim
t→∞
‖θ(t)− θe‖ ≤ ε.
• If Re(λ2 < 0), the system G is unstable (Fig. 1f).
lim
t→∞
‖θ(t)− θe‖ > ε.
III. DYNAMICALLY INDUCED CASCADING FAILURES IN
POWER GRIDS
In this section, we focus on analyzing cascading failures
after the network is attacked from a dynamic perspective.
There are two types of failures: overload failures and unstable
failures. The former mainly occurs in transmission lines and
the latter always induce the malfunction of machines.
A. Overload failures of lines
The original networkG is usually assumed running stably at
the equilibria θ0 (N-0 stable). The steady flow of G is denoted
as F old. After the network is attacked and subsequently causes
line failure, Sca¨hfer et al. [33] studied the case that the residual
network G′ will stably operate at the new equilibria θ′ (N-
1 stable) and the network flow is Fnew. They found the
conversion process of the steady flow (F old  Fnew) is not
abrupt but the oscillations converge. Hence this process can be
approximated by a damped sinusoidal function of time [33]:
Fij(t) ≈ F
new
ij −∆Fij cos(νijt)e
−Dt
∆Fij = F
new
ij − F
old
ij
(7)
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Fig. 2. The conversion procession of flow in transmission line. F old is the
flow of the original network and Fnew is the flow of the residual network after
attack. FC1 and FC2 denote two different capacities of the transmission line.
a The green solid line indicates Fij is smoothly converted after the network
structure has changed. b The red solid line indicates the Eij will shutdown
since the maximal flow Fmax exceeds the carrying capacity Cij .
The maximal flow in this process can be roughly approximated
by Eq. (8).
Fmaxij ≈ Fij + 2∆Fij (8)
The capacity Cij of line Eij is proportional to Kij :
Cij = αKij (9)
where α (0 < α < 1) is the tolerance parameter of lines.
Hence Eij will shutdown when the maximal flow F
max
ij
exceeds its carrying capacity Cij . For example, the small grid
in Fig. 1 is attacked by removing E23, and the conversion
procession of flow is shown in Fig. 2. In traditional static
network flow analysis methods, the corresponding line is safe
since those methods assume that the flow jumps from F old
to Fnew and F (t) is within the limits of FC1 and FC2.
Nevertheless, from Sca¨hfer et. al.’s theory, the conversion
process is dynamic rather than static and whether the line will
failure depends on its carrying capacity C and its maximal
flow Fmax during the dynamic oscillation process. Therefore,
the damped sinusoidal process of flow can detect the overload
line which is ignored by the static flow methods.
B. Small disturbance induced failures of nodes
In this subsection, for the sake of universality, we abandon
the assumption that the network is N-1 stable after the attack.
For a given network, we use Lyapunov criterion (Lemma 1)
to judge the stability of the network. If the network is stable,
each machine will smoothly operate at its equilibrium and the
power system can generate steady flows to users. Conversely,
the network will malfunction when it is unstable at the
equilibrium. In this case, the Lyapunov criterion can only
judge the stability of the network but fails to identify the nodes
or lines that are invalid. In this paper, the small disturbance
analysis method is presented to overcome the drawback of
Lemma 1 and we find a new failure mode based on this
method. The core idea of this method is that it is inevitable
for power systems to suffer the external small disturbance
∆θ(‖∆θ‖ < ε) and machine i is considering reliable if it
can return to the original equilibrium after small disturbance
∆θi. If the state trajectory θ(t)i is divergent after applying the
disturbance ∆θi, the machine (node) i will be damaged and
the lines connected with node i will shutdown duo to overload
(From Eq. (2), the flow of Eij will exceed its capacity when θj
is a constant but θi diverges). The detailed algebraic derivation
is shown as follows:
Let θe = [θe1, θ
e
2, · · · , θ
e
N ] be a equilibrium of unstable
system G. From Eq. (3), ∀i, θei satisfies:
Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) (10)
Now, we apply a small disturbance ∆θ to network G:
θ = θe +∆θ ⇒ θi = θ
e
i +∆θi
θ˙ = ∆θ˙ ⇒ θ˙i = ∆θ˙i
θ¨ = ∆θ¨ ⇒ θ¨i = ∆θ¨i
(11)
Substitute Eq. (11) into Eq. (1):
Mi∆θ¨i+Di∆θ˙i = Pi+
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θ
e
j−θ
e
i+∆θj−∆θi) (12)
The sin term of Eq. (12) can be expanded by Taylor formula:
sin(θej − θ
e
i +∆θj −∆θi)
= sin(θej − θ
e
i ) + cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi) +O(∆θj −∆θi)
2
≈ sin(θej − θ
e
i ) + cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi)
(13)
The reason we abandon the term of O(∆θj − ∆θi)
2 is that
the norm of the small disturbance ∆θ is quite small. Then, by
combining Eq. (10) and Eq. (13), we can deduce:
Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θ
e
j − θ
e
i +∆θj −∆θi)
= Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) + cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi)
= Pi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) +
N∑
j=1
Kij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi)
=
N∑
j=1
Kij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi)
(14)
Substitute Eq. (14) to Eq. (12):
Mi∆θ¨i +Di∆θ˙i =
N∑
j=1
Kij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i )(∆θj −∆θi) (15)
Let βij = Kij cos(θ
e
j − θ
e
i ) and
∑
j βij = βi. Then:
Mi∆θ¨i +Di∆θ˙i =
∑
j
βij∆θj − βi∆θi (16)
The characteristic equation of Eq. (16) is:
Mis
2 +Dis+ βi = 0 (17)
5The roots (poles) of this equation are:
s1 =
−Di +
√
D2i − 4Miβi
2Mi
s2 =
−Di −
√
D2i − 4Miβi
2Mi
(18)
Therefore, the solution of Eq. (16) is:
• If s1 = s2; s1, s2 ∈ R, then ∆θi(t) = (C1 + C2t)e
s2t
• If s1 6= s2; s1, s2 ∈ R, then ∆θi(t) = C1e
s1t + C2e
s2t
• If s1 = µ + νi, s2 = µ − νi; s1, s2 ∈ C, ∆θi(t) =
eµt(C1 cos(νt) + C2 sin(νt))
where C1 and C2 are constants. According to the distribution
of poles, the corresponding phase diagrams are shown in
Fig. 3. Based on the solution of Eq. (16) and Fig. 3, we can
derive the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: Let θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θN ] be one equilibrium of
the network G and ∆θ = [∆θ1,∆θ2, . . . ,∆N ] be the small
disturbance applied to G. If limt→∞∆θ(t)i = 0, Ni will
stably operate at θi. Conversely, if limt→∞∆θ(t)i = ∞, Ni
is exceptional and the divergent state trajectory will induce the
failure of Ni and Ei: (Eq. (2)). Let fi be the state equation
of Ni and Si be the characteristic equation of fi. s1 and s2
are the roots of Si. The criterion to determine whether Ni is
exceptional is:
• If Re(s1) < 0 and Re(s2) < 0, then limt→∞∆θ(t)i = 0,
limt→∞ θ(t)i = θi, the corresponding node is reliable.
• If Re(s1) = 0 and Re(s2) = 0, then limt→∞∆θ(t)i = c,
limt→∞ θ(t)i = c + θi, the corresponding node is also
reliable from the perspective of Lyapunov stability (Sub-
section II-B).
• If Re(s1) > 0 or Re(s2) > 0, then limt→∞∆θ(t)i =∞,
limt→∞ θ(t)i = ∞, the corresponding node is excep-
tional.
From Eq. (18), we can deduce that the convergence or diver-
gence rate of ∆θi determined by Di,Mi, βi. Here, we use
an instance (Fig. 1a) to illustrate the existence of this failure
mode. The parameters we used in this small network are shown
in Table I. Originally, the network G was stably running at the
equilibrium θ0. Then, we attacked network G by erasing the
line E23 and the new equilibrium became θ
′. Nevertheless,
the new equilibrium was unstable judged by Lemma 1. In
particular, the dynamic behavior of N2 was exceptional after
a small disturbance observed by Eq. (16), Eq. (18), Fig. 3, and
Lemma 2. The state trajectory of N2 is shown in Fig. 4. The
curve first oscillates to the new equilibria θ′2 during t = [2, 12].
At t = 14, N2 is disturbed. The state trajectory of N2 quickly
diverges and then induces the failure of N2 and E2: (the blue
edges of Fig. 1a). Further, the cascade mechanism is triggered
and thereupon induces the failure of N4 and N1. Finally, the
network will collapse with cascade propagation.
Integrated the failure modes described in this section, the
complete cascading failures process in power grids is shown in
Fig. 5. For the sake of simplicity, we retain the null hypothesis
that the initial network is stable but the presented method is
still applicable to the unstable initial network.
Stable focus Unstable focus
Stable knot Unstable knot
Central point Saddle
Pole distribution Pole distributionPhase diagram Phase diagram
Fig. 3. Phase trajectory maps of different poles distributions. In pole
distribution maps, the horizontal axis is the real axis and the vertical axis
is the imaginary axis. In phase diagram, the horizontal axis denotes θi and
the vertical axis denotes θ˙i. The green solid lines indicate the corresponding
node is reliable and the red solid lines indicate the corresponding node is
exceptional.
TABLE I
THE SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE SMALL NETWORK
Node Power Equilibrium Equilibrium s1 s2
ID Before attack After attack
(1) -1 0.2453 2.2791 −0.3 + 0.20i −0.3− 1.20i
(2) 1.5 0.5186 -3.9632 1.43 −2.03
(3) -1 0.1284 1.9240 −0.3 + 1.74i −0.3− 1.74i
(4) -1 0.2453 -4.4794 −0.3 + 1.21i −0.3− 1.21i
(5) 1.5 0.7234 3.4478 −0.3 + 1.68i −0.3− 1.68i
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Fig. 4. The state trajectory of N2. In the original network G, the equilibrium
of this node is θ0
2
= 0.5186. After the network is attacked, the node converges
to θ′
2
= −3.9623. However, the new equilibrium θ′ is exceptional. At time
t = 14s, a external small disturbance is applied to this node and it quickly
diverges.
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Overload failures
Disturbance 
induced failures
Attack Disturbance
Fig. 5. Dynamically induced cascading failures of power grids. An attack
on the initial stable network triggers cascading overload failures of lines and
may lead to two results: the network crashes or rebalances. In the second
case, the new equilibrium may unstable and some nodes will fail duo to the
small disturbance. The residual network will then form a new equilibrium
again. This process will loop forever until the stability condition is met, or
the network is completely paralyzed.
IV. RESULTS
Above we roughly used a small network to illustrate the
effectiveness of the presented method. In this section, the
Spanish grid is introduced to verify the applicability of our
method in a real scenario. Duo to the overload failure mode
has been well analyzed in Sca¨hfer et al.’s work [33], we mainly
focus on cascading failures induced by the small disturbance
in our experiment. In this case, we avoid the overload failures
by increasing the tolerance α in Eq. (9) and thereby the
malfunction of nodes and lines is purely caused by the small
disturbance. The standard procedures for our experiment are
shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Small disturbance induced cascading failures
Input: Network G; Number of attacks T .
Initial: The number of failed nodes FN = 0, FN ∈ RT and
failed edges FE = 0, FE ∈ RT .
Output: J ∈ RN×T , FN, FE.
1: for i = 1 to T do
2: G′ = G;
3: Calculate the equilibrium θ of G′(Algorithm 1);
4: Determine whether G′ is stable using Lemma 1. If not,
back to step 8, else, continue;
5: Orderly or randomly remove an edge from G′; % attack
6: Calculate the new equilibrium θ′ of the residual net-
work by Algorithm 1. Calculate the overload lines in
the conversion process: θ → θ′ based on Eqs. (7-9);
7: Determine whether G′ is stable using Lemma 1. If not,
continue, else, break;
8: Determine whether Nj, j ∈ [1, N ] is reliable using
Lemma 2. If exceptional, delete Nj , Jij = 1, else,
Jij = 0, θ
′ = θ;
9: Count the number of failed nodes FN [i] and edges
FE[i] in secondary outage;
10: Determine whether G′ paralyzes. If G′ paralyzes,
break, else, back to step 6;
11: end for
a b
c d
Fig. 6. The distribution of secondary outages in Spanish grid. In this
experiment, the inertia term Mi = 1, the coupling strength K = 8, the
damping coefficient D = 0.5(the same as below). The histograms show the
number of nodes or edges that failed after each attack in 121 attacks. The pies
show the probability of the failed number of nodes or edges after an attack.
In our experiment, the initial network G stably operates
at its equilibrium θ ( Algorithm 2 can also simulate the
case that the initial network is unstable). In fact, the phase
difference |θj − θi|, ∀i, j is quite small in most synchronous
states. Even if the network is attacked, the network can remain
in a new stable equilibrium with a high probability. That
implies cascading failures induced by small disturbances are
difficult to occur. In our experiment, to observe this kind of
failure mode, we have made the network more vulnerable
by appropriately adjusting the model parameters (e.g. Pi) to
increase the phase difference between different oscillators. we
attack network G 350 times by orderly removing one line
in each attack, of which 121 successfully triggered cascading
failures. The macro data distributions of secondary outages
are shown in Fig. 6. On average, about 10% of the nodes
failed duo to external small disturbances in secondary outages.
Therefore, small disturbances can cause the local malfunction
of the unstable network in secondary outages and cascading
propagation will further lead to the paralysis of the entire
network. In summary, cascading failures triggered by small
disturbances are extremely difficult to occur but can cause
power outages throughout the grid.
In Fig. 7, we have counted the degree of failed nodes in sec-
ondary outages. Faults tend to occur first in less-degree nodes
and then indirectly cause the failure of hub nodes through
cascade propagation. It is worth noting that the speed of
cascade propagation is extremely fast and we will explain this
phenomenon from a microscopic perspective. We have selected
two typical nodes (N14 : d(14) = 9 and N10 : d(10) = 1)
to observe their phase trajectory (Figs. 8-9) in Spanish grid.
N14 is reliable and it can return to a new equilibrium after
being attacked or disturbed. The rate of convergence depends
mainly on its damping coefficient D14. N10 is exceptional
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Fig. 7. The degree distribution of the failed nodes in secondary outages. This
histogram counts the degree of failed nodes in 121 attacks.
and its phase trajectory will divergence exponentially after
being disturbed and further lead to the failure of itself and
its neighbors. From Fig. 9 (t > 17s), the propagation of faults
along adjacent nodes is particularly fast, usually less than 0.5s.
From the above data analysis, we can summarize some char-
acteristics of cascading failures caused by small disturbances:
1) Cascading failures induced by small disturbances rarely
happen but can have devastating consequences.
2) Cascade propagation is so fast that it can easily escape
the grid protection mechanism.
3) The propagation path of this kind of failure mode is
from edge nodes to central nodes.
These characteristics are clearly reflected in the large-scale
blackouts in recent years.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, motivated by the advance of dynamically
induced cascading failures in power grids, we proposed a more
general model to analyze cascading failures and its spread
mechanism. Our model abandoned the assumption existing
in the traditional failure models that the network is stable.
Instead, the Lyapunov criterion was introduced to judge the
stability of the network. Based on this theory, besides the
overload failures of lines during the steady flow conversion
process, we found that small disturbances can also induce the
shutdown of exceptional nodes and further trigger cascade in
unstable networks. Through data analysis, this kind of failure
mode has the following characteristics: low incidence, large
destructiveness, and fast propagation speed. Edge (leaf) nodes
are first affected and then lead to the failure of a large fraction
of the transmission grid. The failure will propagate to the
central nodes with an extremely fast rate and result in the
paralysis of the entire network. These characters are consistent
with the blackouts observed in real power grids.
Although we tried to construct a comprehensive dynamic
model to study cascading failures and achieved the desired
results, there are still many challenges before the large-scale
power outage of the grid is fully uncovered. For instance, how
to reasonably allocate the power P of the failed nodes to
their neighbors to bring the network to a new equilibrium.
This is also the reason that we just calculate the data of
secondary outages rather than the final outages in our exper-
iment. There may be no equilibrium in the network because
the inappropriate P may result in no solution to the swing
equations (Eq. (3)). Additionally, how to force the exceptional
node to the stable state before cascade propagation is also a
ticklish problem. The usual solution is to design a controller to
stabilize the exceptional nodes. Nonetheless, such controllers
are always of low-efficiency duo to the propagation speed is
extremely fast (Fig. 9). Meanwhile, when we apply control to
the exceptional nodes, it will inevitably affect the equilibrium
of their neighbors. How to decouple the complex system
presents challenges in designing controllers. In our future
work, we will aim to solve the above problems to ensure the
safe and stable operation of power grids.
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